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Tying:
Enhancing Competition Through the Bank Holding Company
Relationship banking is the process through which banks'
establish ongoing relationships with corporate customers.2 By
gaining specific information about individual customers and
identifying unique needs, banks can more readily fulfill customer
demand, sell more banking products, and increase the bottom
line.3 In the relationship banking context, banks typically evaluate
the overall profitability of their relationships with corporate
customers based on each customer's mix of loans, cash
management services, deposits, and other banking services.4 The
importance of relationship banking is not a new development;
indeed, the practice has been common in the financial services
industry for well over a century.5 The range of products available
in the banking context, however, has greatly expanded in recent
years and culminated in the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999 (GLBA).6
Banks, freed from many restrictions after GLBA, have
greatly expanded their presence beyond the traditional banking
arena.' The commercial lending relationship serves as a springboard
from which banks may offer new services and build relationships with
existing customers in securities underwriting, advisory services,
1. "Bank" as used in this Note applies to bank holding companies. Any
reference to a different type of entity will be expressly stated.
2. See General Accounting Office, Bank Tying Additional Steps Needed to
Ensure Effective Enforcement of Tying Prohibitions, at 8 (Oct. 20, 2003),




6. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999); See generally Paul J. Polking &
Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 4 N.C. BANKING INST.
1 (2000) (detailing the expanded powers of financial holding companies, especially in
securities and insurance activities).
7. GAO Report, supra note 2, at 8. Banks have broadened their horizons into
areas such as securities and insurance. Id. Some banks have used the expansion to
"decrease their reliance on the income earned from credit products... and to
increase their reliance on fee based income." Id.
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insurance offerings, and other financial services.8 A primary purpose
of GLBA was to encourage competition between banks and other
financial institutions, such as investment banks.9 As banks expand
into new territory, bank-specific laws continue to impose restrictions
on how products may be packaged together.1 °
Banks are subject to general antitrust law, most notably the
Sherman Act 1 and the Clayton Act. 2 Yet banks are held to a
more exacting standard because of the unique position they hold
in the nation's economy. 3 Section 106 of the Bank Holding
Company Act Amendments of 19704 (Section 106) generally
prohibits a bank from requiring the purchase of an additional
product as a condition of sale for the purchase of the customer's
desired product. 5 The anti-tying prohibitions of Section 106
reflect congressional concern that banks may leverage their
products to gain a competitive advantage in non-traditional
banking products and services. 6 The anti-tying prohibitions are
not absolute, however, and contain potentially broad exceptions.
17
Ironically, Section 106 sat largely unnoticed for nearly thirty years
until banks significantly increased their expansion into non-
traditional areas in the late 1990's and after GLBA.
The increase in permissible bank activities after GLBA also
gave rise to confusion by corporate borrowers, federal examiners,
and banks regarding the application of Section 106.'" A key area of
confusion involves the underwriting of debt and equity issues. 9
8. See Christian A. Johnson, Holding Credit Hostage for Underwriting Ransom:
Rethinking Bank Antitying Rules, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 157, 177 (2002).
9. Id. at 160.
10. See infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000).
13. See infra notes 52-86 and accompanying text.
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (2000).
15. See generally Anti-Tying Restrictions of Section 106 of the Bank Holding
Company Act Amendments of 1970, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,024 (Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinafter
Proposed Interpretation].
16. Id.; see generally S. REP. No. 91-1084 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N
5519.
17. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.




Section 20 of the Glass Steagall Act 20 (Section 20), generally
prohibited banks from engaging in the issuance, floatation,
underwriting, public sale, or distribution of debt or equity
instruments. 21 Beginning in 1988 expansive judicial interpretations
began to chip away at the prohibitions of Section 20.22 Moreover, a
bank affiliate could legally engage in underwriting so long as the
affiliate was not "engaged principally" in substantial bank-ineligible
activities and revenue from the bank-ineligible activities did not
exceed five to ten percent.23 In 1996, the FRB increased the
permissible revenue level from ten to twenty five percent,24 and
shortly thereafter many banks acquired major securities firms.
25
Indeed, although Congress may have intended to "sever completely
the commercial and investment banking industries," Section 20 fell
well short of its purpose.26 In 1999, GLBA repealed Section 20 and
expressly permitted a bank to engage in securities underwriting
without any revenue limitation.
As a result of judicial and administrative expansion and
GLBA, banks have made significant inroads into securities
underwriting and view the area, with its high profit margins and
relatively low risk, as essential to long-term profitability. 28 For
example, between 1995 and 2002 the market share of the three largest
20. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (repealed 1999).
21. Section 20 specifically forbids the underwriting of so called "bank-ineligible
securities." Yet, Section 16 of Glass-Steagall permits the underwriting of certain
government securities, referred to as "bank-eligible securities." See 12 U.S.C. § 24(7)
(2000).
22. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d. Cir. 1988) (allowing banks to engage in limited securities
activities through subsidiaries by holding Section 20 applies a "less stringent
standard" than other sections of Glass-Steagall).
23. Id.
24. Federal Reserve Board, Order Approving Applications to Engage in Limited
Underwriting and Dealing Certain Securities, 73 FED. RES. BULL. 473 (1997); LISSA
L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE
ACTIVITIES 750 (West 2001).
25. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 24, at 750 (noting acquisitions by five
bank holding companies of major securities firms).
26. See Securities Indus. Ass'n, 839 F.2d at 60. Severance was sought only for the
more "perilous" investments, such as corporate stocks and bonds. Id. Additionally,
Congress intended to control only speculative securities underwriting, not all
underwriting. Id.
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2000).
28. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 171.
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investment banks declined from 38.1 percent to 31.9 percent in debt
and equity underwriting.29 During that same period, the newly-
formed investment banking affiliates of the three largest bank
holding companies saw their market share surge from 17.8 percent to
30.4 percent.3"
Due to the increased competition posed by banks in
underwriting, investment banks allege "commercial banks offer
loans and loan commitments to corporate borrowers at below
market rates," in an effort to obtain the more lucrative
underwriting business.3' Indeed, banks "view their lending
businesses as an important competitive advantage to both retain
current underwriting customers and also attract new ones. ',3 2 If
banks are using their lending power to coerce customers into
obtaining undesired products, this forced relationship could
constitute a violation of Section 106.
Moreover, if a loan was offered at a below-market rate, the
bank may not only face a tying problem, but may also be in
violation of Section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913
(Section 23B). 33  Section 23B prohibits member banks from
making below-market rate loans when dealing with an affiliate.34
In short, Section 23B prohibits a bank from pricing credit for an
affiliate below the market rate in order to reduce the bank's
income for the affiliate's benefit.3 Not only could the below-
market loan be a violation of Section 23B, but it might also
constitute an "unsafe and unsound banking practice.
3 6
Corporate customers may be "unaware of the subtle
distinctions that make some tying arrangements lawful and others
29. See GAO Report, supra note 2, at 25.
30. Id. at 25-26. This result may be misleading, because of acquisition and
consolidation within the investment banking firms. Specifically, the merger between
Citicorp and Salomon Smith Barney was given as an example of the
misrepresentation.
31. Id.
32. Johnson, supra note 8, at 177 (quoting Julie Creswell, Banking's Not-So-Sweet
Weapon, FORTUNE, Oct. 14, 2002, at 158).
33. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 221 - 522 (2000).
34. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2000); see GAO Report, supra note 2, at 2.




unlawful."37 As a result of the perceived lack of knowledge, the
federal government has begun to act on many different fronts to
investigate and attack improper tying practices.38 Congressional
action has come from both the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce39 and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs.4" Additionally, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB)
released a proposed interpretation of Section 106,4" the General
Accounting Office (GAO) published a report in light of an
extensive investigation,42 and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) weighed in as well.43
By enabling banks legally to tie a broader range of products
the FRB provides a large springboard from which banks may
explode into the marketplace for non-traditional bank products."
Despite opposition from the banking community because of the
possibility for "treble damages" and general "flaws,"45 the liberal
interpretation presented by the proposed interpretation greatly
expands the permissible business practices of banks.46 The key
37. Id. at 16.
38. See infra notes 169-197 and accompanying text
39. U.S. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, http://energycommerce.house.gov
(last visited Feb. 7, 2004). The House Committee is under the leadership of
Chairman W.J. "Billy" Tauzin and Ranking Member John D. Dingell. Id. See infra
notes 156-167 and accompanying text.
40. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, Hous. AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
http://banking.senate.gov (last. visisted Feb. 7, 2004). The Senate Committee
operates under the leadership of Chairman Richard C. Shelby and Ranking Member
Paul S. Sarbanes. Id. Chairman Shelby has stated the Senate Committee intends to
hold hearings about tying practices, but at the time of publication no hearings had
been scheduled. Id.
41. See generally Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15.
42. See generally GAO Report, supra note 2; see also infra notes 169-178 and
accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 179-183 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15.
45. See George Stein, Banks Protest Fed Plan to Unlink Loans, Services,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 4, 2003, at 3D. Notably, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and
Bank of America Corp. sent letters to the FRB in opposition to the proposed
interpretation. Id. Additionally, the law firm of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett filed a
121 page comment with the FRB on behalf of holding corporations involving
commercial lending and investment banking such as Citigroup, Bank of America, J.P.
Morgan, Deutsch Bank AG and UBS AG. Id.
46. See Todd Davenport, Fine Aside, Fed Stance on Tying Looks Like Bank Win,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 28, 2003, at 1.
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terms behind the expansion are the liberal definitions employed
for "traditional bank products" and "meaningful choice."47
This Note focuses on the proposed interpretation of
Section 106 set forth by the FRB on August 25, 2003. In analyzing
the future application of the proposed interpretation, this Note
will first discuss the history of Section 106 and the elements of a
tying violation.48 Part II will analyze the proposed interpretation
by the FRB.4 9 Part III will discuss the GAO Report before
discussing other governmental action.5" Finally, in Part IV this
Note will present a viable method for banks to cross-market and
cross-brand products while fully complying with the letter and
spirit of Section 106.51
I. SECTION 106 - THE ROOT OF THE CONTROVERSY
Over half a century ago the United States Supreme Court
in Standard Oil v. United States recognized the anti-competitive
effect of tying by stating, "tying arrangements serve hardly any
purpose beyond the suppression of competition. ', 52  The
importance of banking to the national economy places banks as a
unique threat to impose negative influence. Banks may not
engage in specific product tying arrangements because tying is
thought to result in the concentration of resources, decreased
competition, and impermissible conflicts of interest.53 Yet until the
enactment of Section 106, tying regulations in the banking sector
lacked specific force.54
47. Id.
48. See infra notes 52-103 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 104-168 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 169-197 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 198-248 and accompanying text.
52. 337 U.S. 293, 205-06 (1949); see also S. REP. No. 91-1084, 45 (1970), reprinted
in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5558.
53. S. REP. No. 91-1084, 12 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5530.
54. Id. at 45, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5558.
220 [Vol. 8
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A. The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970
The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970
were the cumulative congressional response to the dramatic
growth of one-bank holding companies." The Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 56(BHCA) expressly excluded all one-bank
holding companies from its coverage. 7 This exclusion manifested
congressional belief that a one-bank holding company could not
present a sufficient danger to warrant inclusion within the scope of
the BHCA.58 As a result of the exclusion, one-bank holding
companies escaped many FRB requirements, such as examination
and annual reports, and were only subject to regulation by state
bank commissions or the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.59 Most notably, one-bank holding companies could
enter into non-banking activities and own non-bank related
corporations.6" By 1969, one-bank holding companies had
engaged in a wide array of ventures including real estate,
insurance, ranching, and pizzerias.61
The lack of regulation made the one-bank holding
company an extremely attractive entity, and by 1969 one-bank
holding companies possessed commercial deposits exceeding $181
billion, or approximately forty-three percent of all commercial
bank deposits.62 The vast number of one-bank holding companies
concerned many lawmakers because of the resulting concentration
of wealth and possible threats to the public interest resulting from
the lack of regulation.63  After nearly two years of debate, 64
Congress changed the definition of a bank holding company to
55. See Carl A. Sax & Marcus H. Sloan, III, Legislative Note: The Bank Holding
Company Act Amendments of 1970, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (1971).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2000).
57. Id.
58. See Sax & Sloan, supra note 55, at 1201.
59. Id. at 1208.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1208 n.61.
62. Id. at 1201.
63. Id. at 1210.
64. See Sax & Sloan, supra note 55, at 1212. Most notably, President Richard
Nixon opposed the one-bank holding company. See id. at 1210 n. 70.
2004]
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include within the BHCA one-bank holding companies.65
Proponents of the amendments saw the change as closing a major
loophole in the original act and eliminating a major weakness of
the legislation.66
Additionally, the 1970 amendments addressed the
retention and acquisition of non-banking affiliates by bank holding
companies. 67 As a result of the inclusion of one-bank holding
companies, a large number of bank holding companies were
engaged in activities prohibited by the BHCA.68 In light of the
conflict, a grandfather clause was included to allow the
continuation of non-banking activities if the activity was lawfully
engaged in prior to June 30, 1968.69 The clause was not all
inclusive and empowered the FRB to terminate the exemption if it
determined it was "necessary to prevent undue concentration of
resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or
unsound banking practices .. .,,70 The final crucial impact of the
1970 amendments was the addition of major anti-tying provisions
through Section 106.7'
B. Legislative History of Section 106
Section 106 was part of a legislative response to judicial
decisions which failed to attack anti-competitive forces in banking
with enough strength.72 Congress' express intent was to apply the
general principles of the Sherman Antitrust Act to banking.73
Furthermore, the amendment was intended to "prevent the further
spread of seriously anticompetitive practices.., in the banking
65. Id. at 1213.
66. Id. at 1201.
67. Bank Holding Company Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 103, 84
Stat. 1763-66 (1970).
68. Sax & Sloan, supra note 55, at 1215.
69. § 103(2), 84 Stat. at 1763-64; Sax & Sloan, supra note 55, at 1216.
70. § 103(2)(B)(ii), 84 Stat. at 1764.
71. See infra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Fortner Enter., Inc. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1968) (holding
a tying arrangement involving credit was not illegal per se); see also S. REP. No. 91-
1084, at 45 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5558.
73. See Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., 92 F.3d 384, 394 (6th Cir. 1996).
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and financial areas.,7 4 Congress sought to ensure the nation of
"adequate safeguards against the possibility of misuse of economic
power of a bank."75  Of special congressional purpose was
"statutory assurance that the use of the economic power of [a]
bank [would] not lead to a lessening of competition or unfair
competitive practices."76
Congress was concerned by the potential combination of
banks with traditional business firms. By merging with a typical
business firm, Congress feared "[a] bank's credit will be more
readily available to the customers of the affiliated business than to
customers of other businesses not so affiliated."77  Moreover,
Congress felt "[a] business firm that can offer an assured line of
credit.., has a very real competitive advantage."78 Because of the
reliance of businesses of all sizes upon bank credit, Congress
determined banks were in a position to strongly suggest a
borrower should purchase additional products in order to
guarantee future access to credit.7 9  Additionally, the strong
suggestions imposed by banks would not only create unfair
competition in the market for certain banking products, but in the
long run would cause a vast reduction of competition in a wide
array of non-banking markets.8" In passionate testimony, the FRB
Chairman stated that if stronger anti-tying prohibitions were not
added to the Bank Holding Company Act:
The Bank might deny credit to competing firms or
grant credit to other borrowers only on condition
that they agree to do business with the affiliated
firm... [I]f we allow the line between banking and
commerce to be eased, we run the risk of cartelizing
our economy... [W]e could later see the country's
business firms clustering about banks ... in the
74. S. REP. No. 91-1084, at 48 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5561.
75. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5520.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5521.
78. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5521-22 (emphasis added).
79. Sax & Sloan, supra note 55, at 1224.
80. Id.
2004]
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belief that such an affiliation would be
advantageous, or perhaps even necessary to their
survival.8'
In no uncertain terms, the legislative history of Section 106
makes congressional intent clear. Without legislative action
Congress felt "the trend toward the combining of banking and
business could lead to the formation of a relatively small number
of power centers dominating the American economy., 82  In
opposition to such a concentration, Congress passed Section 106 to
ensure it would not occur.83 President Richard Nixon summarized
the opposition: "The strength of our economic system is routed in
diversity and free competition; strength of our banking system
depends largely on its independence. Banking must not dominate
commerce or be dominated by it."' 84  In passing Section 106,
Congress did not intend to prevent banks from adhering to the
normal practices of traditional banking relationships.8 Indeed, the
desire and expectation of Section 106 was to protect against
decreased competition; Section 106 was not intended to preclude
appropriate traditional banking practices.86
C. Section 106 Analysis
Section 106 broadly prevents a bank from conditioning the
sale of a desired product87 or service (the "desired product"), upon
the purchase of, or an agreement to purchase, another undesired
product (the "tied product").88 Such arrangements, commonly
known as "tying arrangements" are considered anti-competitive
89
81. S. REP. No. 91-1084, at 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5522.
82. Id. at 44, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5557.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Alan J. Pomerantz & Joan Hayden, The Antitying Provisions of the Bank
Holding Company Act and Loan Workouts, 108 BANKING L.J. 53, 57 (1991).
86. Swerdloff v. Miami Nat. Bank, 584 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1978); see also S. REP.
No. 91-1084, at 17 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5535.
87. While banks offer both products and services, for purposes of this Note
"product" encompasses both products and services.
88. 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (2000).
89. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 24, at 239.
[Vol. 8
TYING RESTRICTIONS
because it is feared the ability to extend credit may centralize
market power in the hands of a few well capitalized banks. 90 Tying
arrangements are not limited to requiring the purchase of an
unwanted product, but can also occur when the desired product is
offered at a discount if the tied product is purchased.9
The Clayton Act9 2 states tying is only illegal if the
arrangement may "substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce."93 The competition
requirement is not present in the bank-specific legislation.94
Although Section 106 does not contain a market effects test, courts
have held it is "all but impossible to define a [tying arrangement]
apart from inquiry into competitive conditions." 95  Without
examining the competitive effects, nearly anything could be
considered a tying arrangement.96 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has held a tying arrangement cannot exist in a market with many
sellers offering unbundled products.97 Even if there are not many
sellers of unbundled products, a tying arrangement can only exist if
there is separate demand for the different products.98
The prohibitions against tying arrangements are not
absolute. Section 106 specifically allows tying arrangements when
the tied product is (1) "a loan, discount, deposit or trust service;" 99
(2) "related to and usually provided in connection with a loan,
discount, deposit or trust service; ' 1°° or (3) a condition or
requirement "reasonably impose[d] in a credit transaction to
assure the soundness of the credit.""1 1 In addition to the statutory
90. See S. REP. No. 91-1084, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519,
5520.
91. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 24, at 239.
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000); Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v Exch. Nat'l. Bank of
Chicago, 877 F.2d 1333, 1337 (7th Cir. 1989).
94. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (2000).
95. Mid-State Fertilizer Co., 877 F.2d at 1338.
96. Id.
97. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11-12 (1984); Mid-
State Fertilizer Co., 877 F.2d at 1338.
98. Id.
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exceptions, the FRB may declare exceptions to the anti-tying
requirements through regulations, provided the exceptions are not
"contrary to the purposes" of Section 106.112 The functionality and
flexibility provided to the FRB by Congress was a critical element
behind the passage of Section 106. 103
II. THE SPRINGBOARD - THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD'S
PROPOSED INTERPRETATION" °
As banks vastly expanded in the wake of GLBA, the FRB
found it "useful and appropriate" to issue an official interpretation
of Section 106 and to provide supervisory guidance for all banks.05
In the proposed interpretation, the FRB vastly expands a bank's
ability to tie products without violating Section 106. The proposed
interpretation "describes the scope and purposes of [S]ection 106,
the elements of a tying arrangement.., and the statutory and
regulatory exceptions to the prohibitions of [S]ection 106 " 16 while
employing the concepts of traditional banking products,0 7 mixed
product arrangements,"' and meaningful choice"° to propose a
scheme through which banks may effectively "cross-market"
products without running afoul of Section 106." ° While not under
102. See § 1972(1). The specific exceptions prescribed through the FRB's
regulatory delegation are found in the Code of Federal Regulations. See generally 12
C.F.R. § 225.7 (2003) (delineating regulatory exceptions).
103. S. REP. No. 91-1084, at 12 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5530.
104. The FRB is vested with the discretionary authority to provide exceptions to
the anti-tying prohibitions which are "founded on sound economic analysis." S. REP.
No. 91-1084, at 46 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5521, 5559. Thus, the
proposed interpretation has a significant statutory basis and should be viewed with
great deference. Inv. Co. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Johnson, supra note 8, at 166.
In Camp, the Supreme Court indicated it would defer to any reasonable
interpretation of Glass-Steagall. 401 U.S. at 626-27. Applying the same analysis to
section 106, it is possible the Court would defer to any reasonable interpretation of
Section 106.
105. See generally Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15.
106. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,024.
107. See infra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 137-151 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
110. See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,024.
TYING RESTRICTIONS
express congressional pressure, but request,"' it is plausible the
FRB wanted to act prior to action by any other governmental
entity. ' 2 According to the proposed interpretation, Section 106 is
"intended to prevent banks from using their ability to offer bank
products, credit in particular, in a coercive manner to gain a
competitive advantage in markets for other products and
services."'"13 An expansive reading of the proposed interpretation
reveals a willingness of the FRB to allow an increasing level of
tying, including the tying of non-traditional bank products.
A. The Elements of a Tying Violation
The "heart of an illegal tying arrangement" is requiring a
customer to obtain an additional product from a bank or an
affiliate." 4 Banks are subject to a stricter standard in which there
are only two essential elements to establish an illegal tying
arrangement:
(1) a condition or requirement exists that ties the
customer's desired product to another product;
(2) this condition or requirement was imposed or
forced on the customer by the bank."5
Without meeting these two requirements, no tying
arrangement exists." 6 The requirement of an additional purchase
is essential; if the customer has an option to purchase the allegedly
tied product no tying arrangement exists.' According to the
FRB, a tying violation would occur if a bank would only grant a
loan if the "customer commit[ed] to hire the bank's securities
111. Although not express, Rep. John Dingell said "federal regulators should
examine how banks link loans to more lucrative services." Stein, supra note 45, at
3D. See also Davenport, supra note 46, at 1.
112. Davenport, supra note 46, at 1. According to one former general counsel at
the FRB, it is always better to "beat a GAO report than to respond to it." Id.
113. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,025.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 52,028.
116. Id.
117. See Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 991 (4th
Cir. 1990) (applying generally to antitrust).
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affiliate to underwrite an upcoming bond offering .... This
arrangement is a violation because the bank conditioned the
availability of credit on the customer obtaining a non-traditional
bank product."9
B. What is Not a Tying Violation
While a prima facie tying arrangement exists when any
product is required to be purchased with a desired product, not
every tying arrangement is illegal.1 20 Statutory exceptions to the
general prohibitions include situations in which the tied product is
"a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service;'1 2' "related to and
usually provided in connection with a loan, discount, deposit or
trust service;"' 122 or "a condition or requirement.., reasonably
impose[d] in a credit transaction to assure the soundness of
credit." 123 Additionally, the FRB may make exceptions that are
"not contrary to the purposes of Section 106. ",124
Section 106 does not prevent a customer from voluntarily
choosing to award some non-traditional banking service to a bank,
even if the customer is already involved in a lending
relationship. 25 Moreover, nothing in Section 106 prevents a bank
from extending a loan out of a desire to further the banking
relationship. 26  A loan made in hopes of furthering the
relationship is permissible, even when the bank makes known its
intentions of securing future business. 2 ' The FRB arguably
encourages these types of activities by stating "Section 106...
does not prohibit.., cross-marketing the full range of products
offered by the bank or its affiliates to a customer or encouraging
an existing customer to purchase additional products .... Cross-
118. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,028.
119. Id. at 52,027.





125. See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,028-29.




marketing and cross-selling activities, whether suggestive or
aggressive, are part of the nature of ordinary business
dealings ....,,8
Only a demand by the bank of an additional purchase by
the customer will result in an illegal tying arrangement. 29 If the
customer demands the bank provide it with an additional product
as a condition of purchase, no tie occurs. 30 It was not the purpose
of section 106 to "prohibit customers from using their own
bargaining power to obtain a package of desired products from the
bank." 3 ' Therefore, corporate customers may demand any
product as a condition of making a purchase from a bank.
The FRB's proposed interpretation states "Section 106
specifically allows a bank to condition both the availability and
price of any desired product on the requirement that the customer
obtain a 'traditional bank product' (the tied product) from the
bank."'32  The FRB expands the category immensely by
enumerating a broad list of "traditional banking products." '33
Accordingly, so long as the tied product is a traditional bank
product, the tying arrangement is legal.'34 Through specific
examples, the FRB shows a permissible tying agreement where the
bank "condition[s] the availability or price of a particular loan on a
requirement.., the customer maintain a specified amount of
deposits with the bank" or requiring a customer to employ cash
management services in order to receive a loan. ,' In both
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. Additionally, it is crucial to distinguish which party imposes the tie
because the distinction is "embedded in [Sjection 106." Id.
131. See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,029.
132. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)(A) (2000).
133. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,030. The FRB includes the
following in the definition of Traditional Banking Product: All types of extensions of
credit (but expressly excluding underwriting, privately placements, and brokering of
debt securities from the definition of "extension of credit), letters of credit, lease
transactions, credit derivatives, servicing loans, all forms of deposit accounts, safe
deposit box services, escrow services, payment and settlement services, payroll
services, traveler's check and money order services, cash management services,
services provided in the administration of an estate, discretionary asset management
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instances, the tying arrangements are legal because the tied
products are traditional bank products.136
C. Mixed-Product Arrangements
The FRB does not require compliance with Section 106
solely through traditional bank products, but recognizes "a bank
may wish to provide a customer the freedom to choose whether to
satisfy a condition imposed by the bank through the purchase of
one or more traditional banking products or other 'non-
traditional' products."' 37 The resulting mix of both traditional and
non-traditional bank products is known as a "mixed product
arrangement."'38  In order to qualify as a mixed-product
arrangement, both traditional and non-traditional banking
products must be offered to the customer.'39 By definition, if a
product arrangement only includes traditional bank products it is
not a mixed product arrangement; however, no tying concern
would exist because of the traditional bank product exception.14°
Ultimately, the mixed product arrangement benefits the customer
through greater flexibility and increased choice. 4' The presence of
a mixed-product arrangement, however, does not guarantee
compliance with Section 106.142 Indeed, further analysis is
required to determine whether an illegal tying arrangement
exists. 143
In order for the mixed-product arrangement to satisfy the
requirements of Section 106, the product arrangement must
provide a meaningful choice to satisfy the bank's conditions solely
through the purchase of traditional bank products.1" The
importance of meaningful choice cannot be overstated. Through
136. Id.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 52,030.
139. See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,030 n.47.
140. Id. at 52,030; see also supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
141. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,030.
142. Id. at 52,031.
143. Id.
144. See Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions Co., 815 F.2d 1407, 1416-17 (11th
Cir. 1987); Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,031 (emphasis added).
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meaningful choice, banks can conceptually require the purchase of
a non-traditional bank product or a similarly profitable mix of
traditional bank products.' 45 Despite the required purchase, the
arrangement is not illegal because it does not "require the
customer to purchase any non-traditional product from the
bank."' 4 6 The bank has provided a meaningful choice to the
customer.' 47 Moreover, "the bank's inclusion of non-traditional
products within the range of tied products may be viewed as giving
the customer additional flexibility in determining how it may
choose to satisfy a condition that the bank is permitted by law to
impose. 148
Alternatively, if the "customer does not have a meaningful
option to satisfy the bank's condition solely through the purchase
of... traditional bank products... then the arrangement violates
[S]ection 106 because the arrangement effectively requires the
customer to purchase [a] non-traditional bank product .... 
1 49
Customer freedom is central to the mixed product arrangement;
consequently, if the customer has no choice to satisfy the condition
of purchase solely through the traditional bank products, no
meaningful choice exists.'5 Thus, as long as a bank customer is
provided a meaningful choice between traditional and non-
traditional bank products, the additional flexibility given to the
customer by adding non-traditional products to the mix




By providing an in-depth example, the FRB provides a
template for a mixed product arrangement in a typical relationship
banking situation.' 52 In the example, the bank holding company
and its affiliates review the overall profitability of its customer
145. Cf. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,030.
146. Id. at 52,031.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 52,031 (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,030.
152. See generally id. at 52,031.
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relationships to determine whether the profitability of the existing
relationships meet the bank's hurdle rate. 5 3 Upon finding the
profitability of a relationship does not satisfy the hurdle rate, the
bank informs the customer it will not renew outstanding credit
facilities unless the customer gives the bank sufficient additional
business to meet the hurdle rate. 5 4 The bank does not require any
specific product purchases to satisfy the hurdle rate, but gives the
customer the freedom to choose from the bank's entire product
line, including a wide range of both traditional and non-traditional
products, in determining how it will satisfy the hurdle rate."
1 55
A meaningful option would exist if the customer could
"reasonably obtain sufficient cash management services from the
[bank] to permit it to meet the hurdle rate."' 156 By satisfying the
condition solely through a traditional bank product, such as cash
management, the customer is not required to purchase any non-
traditional bank products. 57  The actual product purchased to
meet the hurdle rate is irrelevant; the only factor considered is
whether the condition could be satisfied through a traditional bank
product. If, however, the customer could only satisfy the hurdle
rate by purchasing non-traditional bank products then the
customer would "not have a meaningful option to satisfy the
hurdle rate." 58 Therefore, a product offering lacking a meaningful
choice would not qualify as a mixed product arrangement and
would constitute an illegal tying arrangement. 159
E. Profitability
The FRB's proposed interpretation specifically emphasizes
a bank may weigh the profitability of its entire relationship with
the customer in order to determine whether to continue or expand
153. Id. A hurdle rate is the bank's internal profitability threshold. Id.
154. Id. at 52031.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 52,031 n.51 A meaningful option would exist provided Company could
legally transfer its cash management to Bank. Id. Additionally, cash management
services would not be the only viable way to satisfy the condition. Id.





the relationship.' 60  Bankers contend their business strategies
require their corporate relationships to be profitable. 61 Indeed,
one bank executive contends it is legal "to boost profit from
corporate customers by charging more for loans or seeking
additional business such as treasury management or bond
underwriting."' 162 When the market rates for commercial lending
fail to satisfy hurdle rates, it is common for the bank to market
other bank products to the client in an attempt to make the
relationship profitable. 1
63
The profitability of banking relationships was closely
considered throughout the congressional debate surrounding
Section 106.'6 The FRB implicitly approves the use of a hurdle
rate by advocating its use in determining whether to increase the
bank's relationship with a customer. 165  Additionally, banking
regulators have found the profitability focus is "within the bounds
of the law as long as the bank customers have a 'meaningful
choice."' 166  In making decisions throughout the relationship
banking context, the customer may "negotiate with the bank on
the basis of his entire relationship with the bank."'167 Moreover,
the parties may vary the consideration, and affect the profitability
of the entire relationship based upon "the existence or extent of
utilization" of the bank's product line.
68
III. GOVERNMENT STANCE
A. The General Accounting Office Report
The GAO conducted an extensive investigation (1) to find
any evidence suggesting banks engage in unlawful tying and (2) to
determine what federal regulators have done to attack the
160. Id. at 52,030.
161. See GAO Report, supra note 2, at 25.
162. Stein, supra note 45, at 3D (quoting Kenneth Lewis, Bank of America Chief
Executive Officer).
163. See GAO Report, supra note 2, at 25.
164. S. REP. No. 91-1084, at 17 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5535.
165. Cf. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,031.
166. See GAO Report, supra note 2, at 25.
167. S. REP. No. 91-1084, at 17 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5535.
168. GAO Report, supra note 2, at 25.
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problem. 169  Based on the results of the investigation, which
involved research through surveys and interviews with corporate
borrowers, bankers, credit market experts, academic experts, and
federal officials,17° the GAO determined the available evidence did
not substantiate the allegations of banks tying the availability or
price of credit to the purchase of securities underwriting
services.' 7' The lack of empirical evidence, however, is not
conclusive that tying does not occur.172  The absence of
documentation may be explained by the nature of transactions in
relationship banking where negotiations are generally conducted
orally.173 In fact, according to the GAO, borrowers have shown
substantial reluctance to report impermissible tying practices
because of uncertainty as to the legality of the transaction, fear of
adverse consequences for their company, or fear of adverse
consequences to their individual careers. 74
The GAO report concluded banks generally comply with
Section 106.175 The report, however included specific violations,
such as a reduction of a corporate borrower's credit by $70 million
after the customer declined to purchase debt underwriting
services,176  specific executives feeling pressured to purchase
additional products, 77 or corporate customers fearing future
lending might be jeopardized unless additional services were
purchased. 178
B. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC")
has supervisory and regulatory responsibility for national banks
169. See GAO Report, supra note 2, at 2. Additionally, the GAO report
addressed what if any, competitive advantage accounting rules, capital standards and
the federal safety net create for banks. See generally id.
170. Id. at 3.
171. Id. at 4.
172. Id. at 26.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. GAO Report, supra note 2, at 5.
176. Id. at 15.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 16.
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and their subsidiaries.'79 Additionally, the OCC is responsible for
the administration and enforcement of transactions between
national banks and affiliates. 8 ° By stating there are a wide range
of areas where "clarification of the application of Section 106
would be desirable," the OCC sides with the FRB that "adoption
of the interpretation will assist banks and their customers in
understanding the scope of the anti-tying restrictions." 8 ' As a
result of the extensive collaboration between the OCC and the
FRB in formulating the proposed interpretation, the implicit
approval of the OCC permeates the proposed interpretation.'82 As
the office vested with the administration of national banks, the
OCC "will apply the guidance in assessing the anti-tying policies,
procedures and systems of national banks during the supervisory
process."'83
C. Congressional Response
In keeping with the current political spirit of Capitol Hill,
the congressional response to the FRB's proposed interpretation
as well as the GAO report is split along political lines.
Representative Michael G. Oxley,'84 Chairman of the House
Financial Services Committee responded to the GAO report by
stating: "All indications would lead one to the conclusion that
banks are successfully following current law and regulation under
the supervision of the federal banking regulators."'85 Yet, bank
compliance is not a given, and the GAO report only "underscores
179. Id. at 8.
180. Id.
181. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Statement
Regarding the Federal Reserve Board's Proposed Interpretation of the Anti-Tying
Restrictions of Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970
and Related Supervisory Guidance (Aug. 25, 2003), http://www.occ.treas.gov/
ftp/release/2003-65a.pdf.
182. See generally id.
183. Id.
184. Republican - Ohio. CONGRESSMAN MICHAEL G. OXLEY, http://oxley.house.gov
(last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
185. Molly M. Peterson, Despite Report, GAO, Dems, Ask Better 'Tying'
Enforcement, CONGRESSDAILYAM, Oct. 21, 2003, 2003 WL 60130690.
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the importance of continued vigilance" on the part of bank
regulators to ensure compliance with Section 106.186
Representative John Dingell,'87 the Ranking Member of
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, chastised
regulators for not doing enough to prevent banks from coercing
buyers into purchasing multiple products.'88 In a letter to both the
FRB and the OCC, Dingell commended the FRB for the proposed
interpretation, but his praise for the proposed interpretation went
no further.189 According to Dingell, the proposed interpretation
lacks "any strong statement that [the FRB and OCC] expect the
banks to obey the law. The tone of the document appears to be
tilted towards a 'wink and nod' approach to noncompliance.'
190
Specifically, Representative Dingell distinguishes the proposed
interpretation's expansive definition of traditional bank product:
The scope of this term, and therefore this exception,
continues to expand. Pretty soon, there will be no
point to the prohibition. And in the financial
services equivalent of the much-disavowed "don't
ask, don't tell" policy, the interpretation outlines
how banks can link loans to investment banking
deals by setting a "hurdle rate" for customer
relationships that forces the corporate customer to
buy high-fee non-traditional products.' 9'
In conclusion, Dingell emphasizes that free competition
was the motivating factor behind Section 106, and the passage of
GLBA "greatly complicates" preserving that goal by creating
186. Id.
187. Democrat - Michigan. CONGRESSMAN JOHN D. DINGELL,
http://www.house.gov/dingell/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
188. Craig Linder, In Brief: Dingell on Tying: Take This Seriously, AM. BANKER,
Oct. 21, 2003, at 17.
189. Letter from John Dingell, Ranking Member, House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, to Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board and John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of






"innumerable conflicts of interest and opportunities for abusive
behavior."' 92  In strong language the Ranking Member states,
"[i]llegal tying is extortion, pure and simple. It is unclear to me
that [the FRB and the OCC] take this matter seriously."' 93
Representative Dingell's response to the proposed
interpretation is only the latest of a series of exchanges with
banking regulators. 9 4 Since July 11, 2002 Representative Dingell
has publicly prodded the FRB, OCC and GAO to pursue the "pay
to play" practices of banks.'95 Indeed, Representative Dingell's
concerns served as part of the basis for the proposed
interpretation.'96  Earlier correspondence from the Ranking
Member show a marked difference in his opinion of the banking
regulators. '97
IV. THE SOLUTION
How is a bank to comply with the theoretical applications
of Section 106 and the FRB's proposed interpretation? Although
192. Id.
193. Id. Interestingly, Representative Dingell fails to mention WestLB, AG in
alleging federal banking regulators do not take tying arrangements seriously. Id. On
August 27, 2003, WestLB, AG entered into an agreement with the FRB surrounding
alleged Section 106 violations and paid a $3,000,000 fine while neither admitting or
denying wrongdoing. See generally Davenport, supra note 46, at 1.
194. See generally HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE DEMOCRATS,
The Public Record: Consumer Protection (108th Congress), at http://www.house.gov/
commerce-democrats/press/108prconsumer.shtml (providing all correspondence
between Representative Dingell and banking regulators).
195. Letter from John Dingell, Ranking Member, House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, to David M. Walker, Comptroller General, United States General
Accounting Office, (July 11, 2002), http://www.house.gov/commerce-democrats
/press/1071tr179.htm.
196. See Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, to
John D. Dingell, Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce, (Aug. 13,
2002), http://www.house.gov/commerce-democrats/press/081302frboccrsp.pdf.
197. See Letter from John Dingell, Ranking Member, House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, to Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, and
David M. Walker, Comptroller General, United States General Accounting Office,
(Sept. 12, 2002), http://www.house.gov/commerce-democrats/press/1071tr187.htm; see
also Letter from John Dingell, Ranking Member, House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, to David M. Walker, Comptroller General, United States General
Accounting Office, (Nov. 4, 2002), http://www.house.gov/commercedemocrats
/press/1071tr195.htm.
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each case requires an intensely factual analysis, it is possible to set
a wide range of parameters to guide compliance.'98 In an effort to
help banks avoid future litigation, this section outlines a way for
banks to legally tie both traditional and non-traditional bank
products through the offering of mixed product arrangements.1
99
While realizing it will ultimately be a "trial lawyer's exercise to
prove where the limits of the arrangement lie, '' 2° the following
hypothesis provides guidance for banks to ensure compliance with
the meaningful choice requirement of the mixed product
arrangement. Through meaningful choice banks can offer a wide
assortment of financial products and capitalize on increased profit
margins provided by some non-traditional bank products.2 °1 While
better serving client needs and demands, banks will comply with
the letter and spirit of the proposed interpretation and further the
purposes of Section 106.202
A. Preliminary Measures
First, banks should have "policies, procedures and
systems.., reasonably designed to ensure that the bank complies
with the anti-tying prohibitions of [S]ection 106. ' '203 As necessary,
bank employees should be educated and trained in the best ways
of compliance. 2' The education and training should focus on
employees bearing the greatest risk of violating Section 106,
including areas such as corporate relationships, syndicated lending,
credit approval, marketing, and pricing policy.2 5 Additionally, a
strong internal audit should ensure the institution's compliance
with Section 106.206 Recently, one bank created a loan division
specifically for handling loans to investment banking clients. 2 7 The
198. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 137-151 and accompanying text.
200. Davenport, supra note 46, at 1.
201. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
203. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,034.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 52,034-35.
207. Avital Louria Hahn, What's Behind UBS's new Loan Unit? Some See a Link
to Antitying Fervor; UBS Claims Purely Organizational Purpose, INVESTMENT
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attempt to separate lending from investment banking may be
intended to create the impression the two functions are not
linked.2 8 Regardless of the motivation for creating the division, by
centralizing an area dealing with risky relationships, °9 the bank
eases its burden of education, training, and risk management.2 0
In addition to the education of employees, banks should
seek to educate their customers about Section 106's
requirements.21' The subtle distinctions between legal and illegal
tying arrangements cause great confusion among bank customers.
Moreover, the GAO acknowledges "[i]nformation from customers
could be an important step in assessing both implementation of
and compliance with a bank's policies and procedures., 21 2  By
ensuring its customers can play that vital role in enforcement, the
bank could conceivably increase its credibility with regulators
through its customers.1 3
B. The Buffet of Meaningful Choice
Imagine the Sunday brunch buffet at your favorite local
eatery. Just as each diner can satisfy his or her own desires by
eating traditional brunch foods, such as omelets and hash browns,
an occasional customer may desire the non-traditional brunch
product of filet mignon, and the restaurant that is willing to
provide the filet mignon will most likely obtain a competitive
advantage based on its flexibility. Just as restaurants meet
customers' demands, so may banks. At its foundation, meaningful
choice is not difficult to satisfy. The bank must only provide its
customers with legitimate, justifiable options to satisfy conditions
DEALERS DIG., Oct. 20, 2003 available at 2003 WL 7572505. UBS, AG recently
created UBS Loan Finance LLC. Id. Although believed to be the first such
organization for a universal bank, UBS denies that tying concerns were a factor in the
creation, but instead assert the unit was created to "optimize the organizational
structure." Id.
208. Id.
209. "Risky" is only used to describe the relationships as possibly giving rise to a
tie.
210. See generally Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15 at 52,034-35.
211. See GAO Report, supra note 2, at 15.
212. Id. at 39.
213. See id. at 39-40 (noting customers are crucial to compliance).
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placed on desired products through the purchase of traditional
bank products (the "omelet"). So long as the condition may be
satisfied through traditional bank products, the bank is free to
include non-traditional bank products (the "filet mignon") in the
mix.
1. Traditional Bank Products
The FRB seized upon its power to regulate not "contrary to
the purposes" of Section 106,214 and broadly defined what
constitutes a traditional bank product.215 No longer relegated to a
narrow definition, the FRB expanded its meaning to include items
not expressly included in the letter of the statute, but all
encompassing of its spirit.1 6 Indeed, in light of the wide reach of
banks after GLBA, it might only be a matter of time before debt
underwriting, insurance services, and financial advisory services
are seen as traditional bank products.1 7  In order for the
traditional bank product categorization to remain workable, it
must remain a flexible standard.218
Regardless of what is classified as a traditional bank
product, in order to satisfy the requirements of a mixed product
arrangement, the bank must place traditional bank products
amongst the choice of tied products.29 Thus, a bank must place at
least a wide enough selection of traditional bank products with
non-traditional bank products to allow the customer to fulfill the
obligation of the tying arrangement through the purchase of a
traditional bank product.
2 °
214. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1) (2000).
215. See supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
217. Dingell, supra note 189. Indeed, Representative Dingell alleges the term may
eventually be defined so expansively as to be meaningless. Id.
218. Cf. Nat'l. League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), (articulating the
"Traditional Government Function" test as a part of constitutional jurisprudence).
The Traditional Government Function test proved widely unworkable, failed
miserably, and was expressly overruled. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985). For a discussion of the traditional government function test, See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES § 3.9 (2d. ed.
2002).
219. See supra notes 137-151 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 137-151 and accompanying text.
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2. Non-traditional Bank Products
The major benefit of the mixed product arrangement is the
ability for banks to offer non-traditional bank products as a tied
product.221 While requiring traditional bank products in the mix,
the FRB grants banks the ability to also include non-traditional
bank products in the product mix and allow customers the
"freedom to choose whether to satisfy a condition imposed by the
bank through the purchase of one or more traditional bank
products or other 'non-traditional' products, 222  By expressly
including the phrase "or more" in the proposed interpretation, the
FRB opens the door for banks to require a plurality of traditional
bank products to satisfy a condition of sale, while at the same time
only requiring a single non-traditional product.
Therefore, the bank may require the purchase of several
low margin products or a single, high margin product. Thus, a
bank can formulate a combination of traditional and non-
traditional bank products to satisfy its hurdle rate. 223  The
conditions of sale may be satisfied by requiring the purchase of a
checking account, safe deposit box, and cash management services
jointly, or may be satisfied solely through the purchase of a
commercial casualty insurance policy through a bank affiliate.224
Moreover, by focusing on the profitability25  of the entire
relationship, the bank can better formulate a range of feasible
product arrangements that are subject only to the good faith
requirements.226 What suffices as an acceptable combination will
be left wholly to the bank to determine based on its total
relationship with the customer.227
One could argue that a mixed product arrangement which
provides a meaningful choice does not make any sense. 28 Indeed,
it could be possible for a bank to slant the product selection so
221. See supra notes 137-141 and accompanying text.
222. See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,031 (emphasis added).
223. See supra notes 160-168 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 137-159 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 160-168 and accompanying text.
226. See infra notes 239-248 and accompanying text.
227. See infra notes 239-248 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 137-151 and accompanying text.
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dramatically towards expensive, undesirable, or superfluous
traditional products in order to make less expensive and useful
non-traditional bank products more desirable; however, it is
probable such an arrangement would effectively coerce the
customer to purchase a non-traditional bank product and would
therefore be illegal. 9  Such a slanted and unbalanced product
offering, however, would not satisfy the mixed product
arrangement. °  The justification for the mixed product
arrangement lies in the requirement that the choice be a
meaningful choice. 231
3. Meaningful Choice
The FRB states: "the anti-tying policies ... of a bank
offering a mixed-product arrangement play a particularly
important role in demonstrating and ensuring that the bank's
actions with respect to these arrangements are consistent with
[S]ection 106. ,232 In order to be consistent, the customer must
possess a meaningful choice.233 To be "meaningful", the mixed
product arrangement must have a purpose.2 3 4 Meaningful choice is
a meaningful option; the customer must be able to satisfy the
conditions of purchase solely through traditional bank products.235
The meaningful choice arises because the customer may satisfy the
conditions of purchase through non-traditional products.236 Thus,
in order for the choice to be meaningful, the customer must be
able to fulfill its own purpose solely through traditional bank
products.237 As a result, the product offering that is highly slanted
to the bank's advantage and only offers overpriced, unwanted
229. See Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,028.
230. See infra notes 232-238 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
232. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,034.
233. See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
234. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1399 (1993).
235. See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
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traditional bank products will not qualify as a mixed product
arrangement.238
Where should the line be drawn to constitute a meaningful
choice? According to the FRB, a bank's policies must "establish a
good faith belief that a customer offered a mixed-product
arrangement would be able to satisfy the condition[s] ... solely
through the purchase of traditional bank products., 239 Therefore,
the bank bears the burden of proving its good faith belief in the
customer's ability to satisfy the condition without purchasing any
non-traditional bank products. What is necessary to establish the
required good faith belief will vary with the "nature and
characteristics of the [tying] arrangement and the types of
customer(s) to which it is offered. '' 24° In fact, the FRB states that
it will be much easier to prove the good faith belief when dealing
with a large, complex company than with a smaller, less complex
business. 24' Also, the longevity of the bank's relationship with the
customer will make good faith easier to justify as the length of the
relationship is longer.242 Furthermore, the bank "may not weight,
discourage the use of, or otherwise treat traditional bank products
in a manner that is designed to deprive customers of a meaningful
choice.
2 43
In considering any system designed to offer a meaningful
option, a bank should consider the range and types of traditional
bank products it offers. 2' The bank should set a policy to
determine when conditions have been satisfied in a tying
arrangement. This analysis will require the bank to evaluate the
types of products and profit levels typically required to satisfy its
hurdle rate.245 While making these calculations, it is essential for
the bank to keep the realistic needs of the customer as the focus.
2 46
238. See supra notes 137-151 and accompanying text.
239. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 52,034.
240. Id. at 52,035.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 52,034 n.75.
244. Id. at 52,031.
245. Proposed Interpretation, supra note 15, at 53,034-35.
246. See id. at 52,035.
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In determining what product arrangements to present to
customers to provide a meaningful choice, banks should ensure
customer freedom is the focal point of the arrangement. 47 In
essence, so long as the customer is given the freedom to design and
tailor its own banking relationship, the bank will not violate
Section 106.248 Thus, the bank can offer the customer a list of
hundreds of products from which to select the tied product without
giving any requirements. And as the customer selects products it
desires, the bank can determine whether the total mix of the
relationship satisfies its hurdle rate. If it does not meet the hurdle
rate, the bank can repeat the process and ask the customer to
select an additional product, so long as a meaningful option is still
available. This process may be repeated so long as a meaningful
option remains. So long as the customer is willing to comply with
the conditions the bank will obtain the business. Ultimately, when
the customer refuses to comply with an additional purchase and
the bank refuses the loan, another competitive bank will step in
and attempt to foster a new banking relationship.
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the tying debate is not going to disappear in the
near future. Yet, as one of the chief bank regulators in the nation
states, "no one bank has dominance over bank credit." '249 If one
bank refuses to extend credit to a customer, a worthy customer
will be able to attain it elsewhere. In a competitive market the
bank providing the highest customer satisfaction will ultimately
prevail. Moreover, Section 106 "represent[s] a 33-year-old vestige
of [the] high-water period of command-and-control regulation."25
The competitive forces of an open market limit the dominance of
all players far better than would ever be possible through
autocratic legislation. In the wake of GLBA, the competitive
247. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
249. Mara Der Hovanesian, A Banking Rule for Another Era, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 27,
2003, at 104. (quoting John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency).
250. Clyde Mitchell, Study Should Wrap Up Tying, AM. BANKER, Oct. 31, 2003, at
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financial services market provides the necessary check. With
market forces effectively regulating any dominance, the command-
and-control legislation provided by Section 106 is superfluous.
Indeed, it stifles competition.
In the twenty-first century, "are we to believe that big,
sophisticated borrowers are going to be coerced?, 25 Or should we
believe when a company needs credit, "[c]hief financial officers are
smart enough to raise cash with bonds if they can't get bank
loans., 25 2 Bullying may occur in a commercial lending transaction,
but it is unclear whether the bullying is initiated by the borrower
or the lender.253  As one commentator points out, "Enron...
executives may have bullied Wall Street into granting credit in
return for receiving investment banking business.,
25 4
Some view the efforts of investment banks and certain
elected officials as a reactionary movement to block the efforts of
GLBA. Ironically, GLBA was intended to increase competition
by allowing head-to-head competition across all business lines and
has been incredibly effective in achieving that purpose. In every
competition there must be a loser. Losers complain.
DAVID R. KINMAN
251. Der Hovanesian, supra note 249, at 104. See also Dingell, supra note 189
(noting that Comptroller Hawke's belief is "very troubling").
252. Der Hovanesian, supra note 249, at 104.
253. See generally GAO Report, supra note 2.
254. Der Hovanesian, supra note 249, at 104; see generally Vaughn K. Reynolds,
Note, The Citibank and J.P. Morgan Chase Enron Settlements: The Impact on the
Financial Services Industry, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 247 (2004).
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